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THE NEWLY FOUND "COMPASSION'' FOR
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: CIVIL
COMMITMENT AND THE RIGHT TO
TREATMENT IN THE WAKE OF KANSAS V.
HENDRICKS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Society has long dealt with perpetrators of sexual violence
differently from persons accused of other crimes. Why are sex
offenders singled out? Do we fear harm from sexual perpetrators
so much more than harm from murderers, robbers, or drunk
drivers? Perhaps so, as these criminals attack victims so personally and intimately; victims of sexual assault and counselors of
victims have copiously documented experiences of abuse and
recovery in psychological and popular literature. 1 Are sex offenders really any more "sick" or "deviant" than other criminals who
step outside behavioral norms established by our criminal laws?2
Perhaps society's discomfort with sexuality in general, and with
sexual deviance in particular, explains the unique approach to
sexual perpetrators.3 These competing motivations, on the one

1
See, e.g., ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAir-A GUIDE FOR WOMEN
SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1988) (describing self-help strategy nnd recounting
survivors' stories); LisA MANSHEL, NAP TIME (1990) (recounting ordeal of bringing child
abuser to justice); GLADYS DENNY SHULTZ, How :MANY MORE VIC'IThi:s? SOCIETY' AND THE SEX
CRThnNAL (1965) (relating personal experience of sexual assnult nnd proposing societnl
solutions); NEIL WEINER & SHARON E. RoBINSON KURPIS, SHA'ITERED .INNOCENCE-A
PRACTICE GUIDE FOR COUNSELING WOMEN SURVIVORS OF SEXUAL ABUSE (1995) (describing
psychological effects of abuse and treatment strategies).
2
John Monahan & Sharon Kantorowski Davis, Menlally Disordered Sex Offenders, in
MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 191, 191
(John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1983) (describing Californin legislative hearing
on sex offender commitment statute where legislator's comment thnt •any se.--c offender is
mentally messed up, so let's lock the SOBs up and get on with the business of the other
people of California" elicited resounding applause (emphasis in original)).
3
C. Peter Erlinder, Minr=ota's Gulag: Involuntary Treatment for the "Politically RI," 19
WAL MITCHELL L. REv. 99, 158 (1993) (relying on James Mndison's formulntion that the
majority will use its power to disadvantage of persons it finds "most obno.--cious• nnd
suggesting that society finds sexual predators "obnoxious•); Stephen J. Morse, Blame and
Danger: An Essay on Preventative Detentwn, 76 B.U. L. REv. 113, 134 (1996) (noting that
many people cannot fathom deviant sexual behavior so they tend to think something must
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hand to protect society from harm inflicted by sex offenders, and on
the other hand to correct the perceived deviance of perpetrators,
account for the divergent legal approaches to this class of offenders.
Given society's demonstrated abhorrence of sexual deviants,
however, any suggestion that sex offender laws are enacted out of
an altruistic interest in "care and treatment" of sexual offenders is
inherently insincere.4
In order to address public demands for safety,5 state legislatures
have devised a variety of approaches regarding sex offenders,
particularly addressing concerns of reoffense or recidivism. 6
Several states have enacted community registration and notification laws, or "Megan's Laws."7 In some states, judges can commit
persons convicted of sex crimes to a sex offender treatment program
prior to or as a part of sentencing. 8 Other states allow separate
civil commitment hearings for convicted sex offenders who have
reached the end of their prison sentences but whom the state still
considers dangerous. 9

be wrong with sexual deviants); Robert Teir & Kevin Coy, Approaches to Sexual Predators:
Community Notification and Civil Commitment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 405, 416 (1997) (noting psychoanalytic theories of 1930s advocated "treatment"
of sexual deviants).
4
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated 422 U.S. 563 (1975)
("To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement
is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates tho
very fundamentals of due process.").
6
Morse, supra note 3, at 116 (noting that absolute safety is impossible without drastic
intrusions on individual liberty).
6
See, e.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 992 (Wash. 1993) (noting that Community
Protection Act of 1990 was passed in response to citizens' concerns regarding recidivist sex
offenders, particularly one recent sexual attack on young Tacoma boy); see also Morse, supra
note 3, at 139 (casting doubt on assumption that sexual offenders are more likely to reoffend
than other types of criminals).
7
E.g., O.C.G.A. § 42-9-44.1 (1997); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:546(A) (West Supp. 1998);
Miss. CODE ANN.§§ 45-33-17, -19 (Supp.1997); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-32-15 (1997); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-39-106 (1997); see Teir & Coy, supra note 3, at 405-06 (referring to Now
Jersey case ofMegan Kanlm, seven-year-old girl raped and killed by man with record ofsox
offenses); Dale Russakoff, Out of Grief Comes a Legislative Force: From Megan's Laws to
Jimmy's and Jenna's, WASH. POST, June 15, 1998, at Al (describing trend of"memorial laws"
named after juvenile victims of violent crimes).
8
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-13-201 to -216 (West 1998) (providing for commitment in
lieu of sentencing); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/8 (West 1992) (allowing indefinite
commitment as substitute for prosecution).
9
In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Minn. 1996) (affirming civil commitment of fiftyfour-year-old sex offender under "sexually dangerous persons" act who spent most of his life
in criminal justice system).
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The Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks 10 recently upheld
just such a post-sentencing commitment statute. The statute was
premised on concerns for public safety and crime prevention, 11 but
nominally suggested a state objective of "care and treatment" of sex
offenders.12 The Supreme Court in Hendricks, however, did not
squarely resolve the issue of whether the state must actually
provide treatment to persons committed as sexually violent
offenders in order to justify the confinement. 13 Unless treatment
is provided, sex offenders committed under statutes such as
Kansas's are locked away under the pretense ofrehabilitation, with
no real possibility of release. Thus, if a state deprives an individual's liberty for a rehabilitative purpose, it must provide treatment
to effectuate that rehabilitation. 14 If states do not provide treatment, they reveal their true legislative purpose as ensuring safety
to the public at large rather than caring for the "sick" offender.
The nod to "treatment" in the language of sex offender statutes,
such as in the Kansas Act, fails to save such acts from constitutional challenges of impermissible preventative detention unless states
provide treatment. 15

117 s. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1997).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994) (describing sexual offenders ns "extremely
dangerous," noting high likelihood ofreoffense, and pledging need for legislature to address
"risk").
12
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (noting that legislature established Act to provide "care
and treatment of the sexually violent predator").
13
The majority in Hendricks dodged the treatment issue on alternative grounds, first
suggesting that the Court has "never held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly
detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to
others." Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084. Second, the Court suggested that the Kansns
Supreme Court's decision could be read as concluding that Hendricks' condition was treatable
and that the state had provided "meager" treatment. Id. at 2085. In dissent, Justice Breyer,
joined by Justices Stevens and Souter and Justice Ginsberg in part, noted that the case did
not require the Court to decide if treatment is always required ns a part of commitment, that
is, whether an untreatable, mentally ill, and dangerous person could be civilly committed.
Id. at 2089 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
14
Paul Holland & Wallace J. 1flyniec, Whateuer Happened to the Right to Treatment?:
The Modem Quest for a Historical Promise, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1791, 1792 (1995) (describing
right to treatment argument in relation to juvenile detainees).
15 State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 135-36 (W15, 1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (joining
many judges from Wisconsin and other jurisdictions who have found that similar statutes
create unconstitutional preventative detention); Morse, supra note 3, at 135 (noting that civil
commitment of sexual predators is unjustified and does little to enhance public safety).
lO

11
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In light of heart-wrenching stories of sexual abuse and public
demands for safety, the Hendricks case presented the Supreme
Court with compelling facts on which to uphold the Kansas
commitment strategy. After all, the statute prevented the release
of a man whose history of sex crimes, incarceration, and institutionalization spanned nearly two decades, and who admitted he still
had sexual desires for children but could not control his urges. 16
Faced with that evidence, the Court would have been hard-pressed
to strike down the Kansas statute by finding that such a predator
received inadequate treatment for his disorder, or that perhaps he
could never be treated effectively. 17 Nevertheless, this Note will
argue that the issue of treatment of sexual offenders committed to
psychiatric facilities cannot, on a constitutional level, and should
not, on a policy level, be so readily dismissed.
Part II of this Note will review the constitutional requirements
of civil commitment generally as outlined by the Supreme Court
and interpreted by lower courts, particularly in reference to
commitment of sexual offenders. 18 Part III will examine the
constitutionality of civil commitment statutes drafted particularly
for sex offenders. 19 Part IV will take a closer look at the legal
issues regarding treatment as an element of civil commitment of
sex offenders. 20 Part V will examine the appropriateness of
confining so-called sexually dangerous persons under a treatment
model, and will conclude that the purported state objective of
providing treatment is disingenuous and a facade for the true

16

In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130-31 (Kan. 1996) (describing Hendricks's testimony
stating that he first exposed himself to two girls in 1955 and spent almost half his life in
prison or psychiatric institutions), rev'd sub nom. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072
(1997); Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2074 (describing testimony where Hendricks agreed ho is a
pedophile, is not cured, and cannot control his urges when "stressed out").
17
Hendricks himself told a psychologist at the state security hospital that "treatment was
bullshit." In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 143 (Larson, J., dissenting); see also Leading Cases,
Involuntary Commitment of Violent Sexual Predators, 111 HARV. L REv. 259, 266 (1997)
(noting that Hendricks may be read narrowly in light of its "peculiar factual circumstance"
but likely will be applied as extension of states' civil commitment powers); see, e.g., In re
Haga, 943 P.2d 395, 397 (Wash. 1997) (rejecting Raga's constitutional challenges in cursory
discussion based on Supreme Court holding identical Kansas statute constitutional in
Hendricks).
16
See infra notes 23-50 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 51-84 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 85-180 and accompanying text.
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objective of indefinitely detaining a particularly disfavored class of
criminals.21 Finally, Part VI will examine more principled alternatives available to state legislatures facing the problem of se}..'Ual
violence.22
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR GENERAL
CIVIL COMMITMENT STATUTES

Civil commitment statutes for sexual offenders are derivations of
general civil commitment statutes in most states which authorize
involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill persons.23 Involuntary
commitment to a psychiatric facility violates an individual's
constitutionally protected liberty interest.2"1 Such interference is
constitutionally permissible, however, if the individual is both
dangerous and mentally ill.25 The state must prove both elements
to continue the confinement.
A state cannot involuntarily commit a mentally ill individual who
is not dangerous. The Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson
established the right of a mentally ill individual who poses no
danger to himself or others to live freely in the community.26 In
that case, the state had confined Donaldson to a state hospital for
fifteen years based on a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Over
the years, Donaldson repeatedly, though unsuccessfully requested
release, arguing that he was not mentally ill, or even if he was,
that the hospital was not providing treatment for his illness.27

21

See infra notes 181-223 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 224-240 and accompanying text.
23
States explicitly recognize that their general civil commitment laws do not reach the
alleged "sexually violent predators" and draft sex offender statutes with that fact in mind.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994) (describing sexual predators ns dangerous, but
lacking "mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment
pursuant to [general involuntary commitment statute)").
24
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (noting that involuntary commitment
involves "massive curtailment of liberty").
25
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2075 (1997) ("[TJhis Court hns sustained a
commitment statute if it couples proof of dangerousness with proof of some additional factor,
such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality'"); Addington v. Te.'W.S, 441 U.S. 418, 433
(1979) (holding that state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that individual is
both mentally ill and dangerous).
26
422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
zr Id. at 565-66.
22
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The hospital superintendent maintained that although Donaldson
was not dangerous to himself or others, the state could continue to
confine him because he was mentally ill and would have difficulty
adjusting to life outside the hospital.28 The Supreme Court,
however, rejected that argument and held that concerns about a
mentally ill person's standard of living in the community or the
public's reactions to his eccentricities were insufficient to overcome
Donaldson's fundamental liberty interest.29
Likewise, a state generally cannot infringe an individual's liberty
interest merely by demonstrating the person is dangerous. The
Supreme Court has refused to allow civil confinement of individuals
who are not mentally ill but who nevertheless pose a danger to
themselves or others except under narrow circumstances. Based on
that principle, two individuals in United States v. Salerno 30
challenged their pretrial detentions under the Bail Reform Act of
1984.31 The state had detained the challengers on multiple
charges including Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act violations, mail and wire fraud, extortion and various criminal
gambling violations.32 The Court rejected the challengers' due
process claim and upheld the pretrial detention scheme for
individuals arrested for serious crimes. In such cases, the state
need not show the detainee is mentally ill because of the compelling
government interest as well as the specific, identifiable threat to
the public. 33

28

Id. at 567-68.
Id. at 575 ("[T]he mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from
preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. • . • Mere public intolerance or
animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty."). But
cf. John Q. La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30
BUFF. L. REv. 499,535 (1981) (advocating for commitment on finding of mental illness alone,
in narrow situations, rather than forcing state "to abandon many citizens affiicted with
serious mental illness to a lifetime of abject suffering based on a conclusive presumption of
rational choice").
30
481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987).
31
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1994); see Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741 (describing Act as allowing
federal courts to detain arrestee pending trial if government demonstrates that it cannot
arrange for release of suspect in manner that would assure safety of community and others).
32
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 743.
33
Id. at 750-51 (discussing government's interest in preventing crime by arrestees and
congressional finding that serious offenders are likely to commit dangerous acts in tho
community after arrest).
29
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The Court in Foucha v. Louisiana,34 however, refused to sustain
post-sentence civil commitment on the basis of dangerousness
alone. In that case, the state initially committed Foucha on a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.35 Foucha was tried for
burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm. 36 After four years of
confinement, the court reviewed Foucha's condition.37 Doctors
testified that Foucha's mental illness was in remission, but that he
had an "antisocial personality, a condition that is not a mental
disease and that is untreatable."38 As to the element of dangerousness, one doctor equivocally testified that he would not "feel
comfortable" certifying that Foucha would not be a danger to
himself or others.39 The Court nevertheless rejected Foucha's
continued confinement and distinguished the Salerno federal
confinement scheme from the Louisiana commitment statute. The
Bail Reform Act was carefully limited in its application and
afforded ample procedural protections, while the Louisiana scheme
broadly permitted indefinite confinement and placed the burden of
proving lack of dangerousness on the patient himself. 40
The Foucha decision resulted in considerable confusion and
disparate interpretation by lower courts addressing the mental
illness element of civil commitment.41 The Supreme Court has
never clearly articulated a definition of "mental illness" that passes
constitutional muster,42 instead deferring to legislative judgments
~

504 U.S. 71, 75 (1992).
Id. at 74.
35
Id. at 73.
37
Id. at 74.
38
Id. at 75.
39 Id.
40
Id. at 81-82. The Louisiana statute provided for commitment to a psychiatric hospital
of defendants deemed not guilty by reason of insanity. Either the hospital or the acquittee
could initiate release proceedings. If the court recommended release, the state held a
bearing to assess dangerousness. If the patient failed to prove be was not dangerous, the
court ordered him returned to the institution. Id. at 73.
n See John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention of
Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293, 1312-16 (1996) (describing lower courts'
treatment of Supreme Court precedent and outlining standards for civil commitment).
~ State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 123 (Wis. 1995) (noting that Supreme Court has used
numerous terms to describe mental condition of persons subject to civil commitment};
Deborah L. Morris, Note, Constitutional Implications of the Inuoluntary Commitment of
Sexually Violent Predators-A Due Process Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 594, 638 (1997)
(noting that Supreme Court bas not defined term "mental illness•).
35
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to define psychological conditions that justify commitment.43
Despite the detailed discussion of mental condition and commitment in Foucha, that opinion provides lower courts with limited
guidance. Justice O'Connor's concurrence with the four-Justice
Foucha plurality further obscures the constitutional requirement.
Justice O'Connor noted that a state might constitutionally commit
an acquittee, such as Foucha, who had regained sanity, if the
detention were narrowly tailored to a state interest and if there
were a "medical justification.»44
Lower cop.rts might interpret Foucha as holding that some, but
not all, mental conditions may be classified as "mental illness" for
the purpose of civil commitment.45 The difficulty state legislatures face is in drawing that line. Some states have interpreted
Foucha to stand for the proposition that "antisocial personality
disorder" is not a mental illness per se and thus cannot sustain
commitment. 46 At least one court, through some careful hairsplitting, rejected a challenge to the statutory language of"personality disorder" by suggesting that the objectionable term in Foucha
was "antisocial personality."47 Other courts have relied on Foucha

43
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983) (noting that "courts should pay
particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments"); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1017
(Wash. 1993) (noting need for deference given uncertainty of psychiatric diagnoses); Androw
Hammel, The Importance ofBeing Insane: Sexual Predator Civil Commitment Laws and the
Idea ofSex Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 Hous. L. REv. 775, 795 (1995) (noting that O'Connor's
concurrence in Foucha advocated judicial deference to legislative judgment).
« Foucha, 504 U.S. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that dotontion
narrowly tailored in nature and duration to public safety concerns, which Louisiana schomo
was not, might be permissible but rejecting dissenters' view that acquittees could bo
"confined as mental patients absent some medical justification for doing so").
45
See Erlinder, supra note 3, at 141 (describing possible interpretations of holding in
Foucha).
46
E.g., Youngv. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744,750 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (relying on Foucha in
holding that "mere presence of antisocial personality, or other personality disordor falling
short of mental illness, is constitutionally insufficient to support indefinite confinomont"),
47
In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1006-07 n.12 (noting that "personality disorder" is a
recognized mental disorder, whereas "antisocial personality" was labeled "Condition Not
Attributable to a Mental Disorder" (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANuAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-ill-R (3d ed. rev. 1987)). "Antisocial
personality disorder," however, is considered a mental disorder in the current DSM-IV.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANuAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS:
DSM-IV (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Because of the difficulty in precisely describing
mental illnesses, as well as the changing definitions even among professionals, courts
generally do not rely on the DSM as conclusive authority. See, e.g., In re Linehan, 557
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to afford legislatures broad discretion in defining the mental
condition of individuals subject to civil commitment.48
The elasticity of the mental illness requirement as defined in
Foucha has found particular favor with courts construing sexual
predator statutes. Such statutes typically provide broad definitions
of "mental disorder" or "mental abnormality" rather than specific
medical definitions of "mental illness.n-1 9 Thus, the manner in
which a state defines the mental condition that will support
commitment is significant in deciding whether treatment must also
be an element of the confinement.60

III.

CIVIL COMMITMENT OF

SEXUAL OFFENDERS

The sex offender commitment statute upheld in Hendricks,
patterned after a Washington statute,61 encompasses the traditional elements of mental illness and dangerousness required for
civil commitment but is specially tailored to the target population.
The state can commit an individual deemed a "sexually violent
predator," which is a person (a) convicted or charged with (b) a
sexually violent offense (c) who suffers from a mental abnormality
or personality disorder (d) which makes the person likely to engage

N.W.2d 171, 176-77 (Minn. 1996) (describing dispute between experts regarding diagnostic
categories of mental illness as defined by DSM); Cornwell, supra note 41, at 1321-22
(describing difficulty of reliance on DSM due to multiple revisions). The DSM is a
standardized nomenclature of mental disorders developed by a team of physicians and
designed for use by clinicians and researchers. DSM-IV at xv-xvii
48 State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 123 (WIS. 1995) ("The [Supreme] Court bas wisely left
the job of creating statutory definitions to the legislators who draft state lnws"). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court also cited Justice O'Connor's concurrence on "medicnljustification"
for commitment, concluding that continuing treatment aimed at reducing a patient's
dangerousness provided such justification. Id. at 127-28.
49
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2080-81 (1997) (•Contrary to Hendricks'
assertion, the term 'mental illness' is devoid of any talismanic significance. • • • Indeed, we
have never required State legislatures to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil
commitment statutes.").
50
See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75 (1992) (finding Foucha suffered from
condition that was not mental illness and was not treatable).
51
WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 71.09.010-.090 (1992 & West Supp. 1998); see also In re Hendricks,
912 P.2d 129, 131 (Kan. 1996) (noting that 1994 Kansas statute followed Washington
scheme).
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in acts of sexual violence.52 In addition to these substantive elements, the Act provides various procedural requirements for
commitment.
The Kansas procedure for commitment and release is as follows:
Just before an inmate is due for release, the prosecuting attorney
presents the defendant to the judge to show probable cause that the
criminal is a sexually violent predator.53 On finding probable
cause, the judge orders the individual transferred to an appropriate
facility for professional evaluation. 54 To commit the individual,
the state then must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil trial
that the individual is a sexually violent predator.55 If that burden
is met, the person is transferred to a mental health treatment
facility. 56 On the basis of an annual review 57 or on the recommendation of the hospital superintendent,58 the court can order
release after a hearing to determine whether the person's mental
abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit
predatory acts of sexual violence if released. The state still bears
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is not safe to be at large and likely will engage in acts of sexual
violence if released.59
Sex offender commitment statutes have faced an array of
constitutional challenges, all of which the Supreme Court rejected
in Hendricks. 60 One series of challenges raised by alleged sexually

62
Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 132 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 59-29a02(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996));
see also Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional
Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 187-88 (1996) (describing

elements of sex offender commitment schemes as (1) past conduct, (2) mental disorder, and
(3) likelihood of future harm).
63
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04 (1994 & Supp. 1996); see also Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 13233 (outlining statutory scheme for commitment and release). Other states provide different
criteria and procedures for commitment. A comparative survey of those statutes is beyond
the scope of this Note, but elements of other approaches will be discussed more specifically
regarding the issue of treatment. The Kansas statute is illustrative of civil commitment
schemes generally and is of particular significance after the Supreme Court's ruling on its
constitutionality in Kansas u. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
64
Id. § 59-29a05.
65
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06-a07(a).
66
Id. § 59-29a07.
67
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08.
68
Id. § 59-29al0.
69 Id.
60
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076 ("Hendricks challenged his commitment on, inter alia,
'substantive' due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto grounds.").
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dangerous persons rests on procedural due process grounds. The
Supreme Court has recognized that commitment to a mental
hospital produces "a massive curtailment of liberty"61 which thus
requires due process protection. 62 The Kansas statute, however,
overcomes the various procedural due process flaws of earlier
commitment statutes. First, the statute requires a hearing (before
a jury if demanded) both for initial commitment and for subsequent
release. 63 Second, the individual facing commitment has a right
to counsel. 64 Third, the Kansas scheme requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the individual is a sexually dangerous
person, a standard exceeding the clear and convincing evidence
standard required for general civil commitments.65 Finally, the
Kansas statute places the burden of proof on the state66 rather
than on the person facing commitment. This provision overcomes
one of the flaws in the Louisiana statute rejected in Foucha. 61
These provisions in the Kansas statute comply with Supreme Court
precedent on due process in civil commitment.68
States enacting sex offender commitment schemes also face
substantive due process challenges. "This Court repeatedly has
recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a

61

Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
63
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a06, 59-29al0.
6' Id. § 59-29a06.
65
Id. § 59-29a10; see also Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-31 (evnlunting merits of higher and
lower standards in light of individual's deprivation ofliberty, state's interest in commitment,
and uncertainty of psychiatric diagnosis).
66
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29al0.
67
See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (noting thnt under statute state carries
burden to prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and
dangerous" (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983))); see also supra notes
34-44 and accompanying text (discussing problems with statute in Foucha).
68
See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1980) (requiring procedurnl due process
protections, including notice, hearing, opportunity to present witnesses, independent
decisionmaker, statement ofreasons, and availability of counsel for transfer of prison inmnte
to mental hospital); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (holding that due process
requires full hearing with presence of counsel, right to confront witnesses, and right to
present evidence for person committed as sex offender in lieu ofincnrcerotion); Bnxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1966) (finding equal protection violation becnuse general civil
commitments require judicial review before jury, but statute under review nllowed postsentence commitment only on administrative andjudicial ruling that individual "mny require
care and treatment").
62
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significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection. "69 An individual's liberty interest is important and fundamental but can be subordinated to compelling state interests,
addressed by narrowly drawn laws. 70 Substantive due process
claims are pivotal to the issue of the right to treatment because of
the justifications states rely on for depriving the liberty of sexually
dangerous persons.
In the context of civil commitment, the Supreme Court has
established as a matter of due process that "the nature and
duration of commitment must bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed."71 The two state
purposes most commonly asserted to justify civil commitment are
protection of society under the state's police power and protection
of an incompetent individual under the parens patriae power. 72
Under their police powers, states have authority to ensure public
health and safety by protecting the community from persons who
are dangerous. 73 Accordingly, a state may incapacitate an individual because a dangerous person's liberty interest is outweighed by
the government objective of preventing harm to others74 and
preserving an organized society.75 Police power is a particularly
salient justification for commitment of sexual offenders who are
perceived as extremely dangerous. 76
69

Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987) (recognizing "importance and
fundamental nature" of person's liberty interest which must be balanced against "greater
needs of society"); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1000 (Wash. 1993) (describing "strict scrutiny
test" for state laws that impinge on fundamental rights).
71
Jones, 463 U.S. at 368 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S, 715, 738 (1972)).
72
See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (noting that state has legitimate interest under
parens patriae and police powers); Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of
the Mental Health System: Expanding the Normative Focus o{Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
1 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'y & L. 161, 183 (1995) ("Civil commitment statutes reflect tho state's
police power and parens patriae authority.").
73
Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
74
State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 128 (Wis. 1995) ("The balance can favor dangerpreempting confinement under proper circumstances"); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 919
n.2 (Minn. 1994) (Wahl, J., dissenting) (describing legislative intent to "make possible tho
control of dangerously psychopathic persons without having to wait for them to commit a
shocking crime").
75
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) ("In determining whether a substantive
right protected by the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to balance 'the
liberty of the individual' and 'the demands of an organized society.' " (citation omitted)).
76
See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 992 (Wash. 1993) (noting legislature determined
"exceptional risks" of sexual predators justified special civil commitment statute).
70
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Parens patriae traditionally referred to states' paternalistic
protection of juveniles,77 but the power also extends to protection
of other disabled or incompetent persons, including mentally ill
individuals. 78 Under parens patriae power, states' interest in civil
commitment is to provide care and treatment to citizens who are
unable to care for themselves.79 In exercising its parens patriae
power, a state acts in the best interests of the persons it seeks to
protect.80 In civil commitment, the "best interest" of the afflicted
individual is to provide care and treatment in order to rehabilitate
-him so that he can successfully reenter society.81
Alleged sex offenders also challenge commitment statutes under
the double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.82
In defense of such claims, a state must demonstrate that the
commitment is civil and non-punitive in nature.83 In the face of
such a challenge, a demonstration by the state that the intent and
effect of the commitment scheme is to treat, rather than to punish,
becomes particularly compelling.84 Thus, a state may premise its
commitment statute on treatment in order to rebut constitutional
challenges but may, in fact, have no actual interest in improving
the welfare of persons it commits as sexually violent predators.
77

See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (describing origins of juvenile justice system);
Julian W. :Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 104-05 (1909) (noting power of
court of chancery to intervene in best interests of child).
78
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 47 (defining pnrens patriae ns state acting as
"the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics"); Gilbert T. Venable, Note, The
Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits ofJuuenile Court Powers,
27 U. Prrr. L. REv. 894, 895 (1966) (describing origin of parens patriae ns English King's
power to protect children and "idiots").
79
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
80
See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (describing due process limits on
curtailment of individual liberty interest under parens patriae power).
81
See, e.g., Cameron v. Walsh, No. 95-10904-PBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11691, at *19
(D. Mass. July 23, 1996) (describing legislative purpose behind sexunl predator act in
response to challenge that statute was aimed at punishment rather than treatment); M.
CherifBassiouni, The Right ofthe Mentally m to Cure and Treatment: Medical Due Process,
15 DEPAUL L. REv. 291, 300 (1966) (noting that commitment on parens patriae grounds is
to "care, treat and restore [the mentally ill individual) to a useful role in society").
82
See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (1997) (rejecting ex post facto and
double jeopardy claims).
83
E.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 996-97 (Wash. 1993) (considering whether legislature
intended statute as civil and whether effect of statute is so punitive ns to negate that intent).
84
Id. at 997 (finding Washington statute civil rather than criminnl because it "focused
on treating petitioners for a current mental abnormality").
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SEX OFFENDER COMMITMENT

In sex offender commitment acts, states may use treatment as a
"hook" on which the commitment scheme can be found constitutional, even though they have no real interest in actually "caring for''
sexually violent predators. For example, the Kansas statute at
issue in Hendricks contains incongruous statements suggesting that
the legislature premised the statute on care and treatment but
lacked any actual intention to provide such treatment to sex
offenders.85 The Kansas Supreme Court, in adjudging the state
statute unconstitutional, offered a similar critique: "It is clear that
the overriding concern of the legislature is to continue the segregation of sexually violent offenders from the public. Treatment with
the goal of reintegrating them into society is incidental at best.
The record reflects that treatment for sexually violent predators is
all but nonexistent."86
The Hendricks case involved a challenge to the Kansas Sexually
Violent Predator Act of 199487 brought by Leroy Hendricks.
Hendricks pied guilty in 1984 to two counts of indecent liberties
with two thirteen-year-old boys and was serving a five to twentyyear sentence.88 In 1994, Hendricks was scheduled for release to
a halfway house, but the state filed a petition to commit Hendricks
as a sexually violent predator under the Act. 89 Hendricks challenged the petition on various factual and procedural grounds and
further suggested the Act was unconstitutional.90 At trial, Hendricks testified that he was sixty-years-old and that his history of
sexual involvement with children began in 1955, when he exposed
himself to two girls. 91 Hendricks further described himself as a
pedophile who could not control his urges to molest children and
admitted he was not cured of the condition. 92 A psychologist
85
See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (describing inconsistent languago in
Kansas act).
.
86
In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Kansas v. Hondricks,
117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
87
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).
88
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2078 (1996); In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130.
89
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
90
In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130.
91
Id. at 130-31.
92
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078-79; In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131.
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testified for the state, asserting that he did not believe Hendricks
was mentally ill or had a personality disorder, but concluding that
Hendricks was a pedophile, which the doctor believed satisfied the
definition of "mental abnormality" in the statute.93 A jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks was a sexually
violent predator and ordered him committed to the Larned State
Hospital.94 Hendricks challenged the ruling in part on evidence
that the hospital had no treatment program in place for sexually
violent predators.95 Nevertheless, the Court denied his motion to
dismiss, or in the alternative for a new trial, and Hendricks was
transferred to the hospital.96
Hendricks subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari under the due process, ex post facto, and double jeopardy
clauses of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court heard the
case but rejected all ofHendricks's challenges and held the Kansas
Act constitutional.97 Hendricks's due process challenge turned on
the statutory definition of "mental abnormality."98 The Court
relied on Foucha99 to hold that a statute is not required to specify
"mental illness" per se100 and held that Kansas' statutory definition sufficed for due process purposes. 101
The Court also considered Hendricks's claimed right to treatment
on ex post facto and double jeopardy grounds, both of which require
a non-punitive statutory purpose. 102 The Kansas legislature,
however, did not clearly identify a non-punitive purpose. Instead
it expressed the state purpose in two inconsistent statements. The
legislature explained its rationale in seeking a special commitment

93

In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079; In re Hendricks 912 P.2d at 131.
95
In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131.
96 Id.
97
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076, 2098.
98
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (" 'Mental nbnormnlity' means n
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such
person a menace to the health and safety of others."); Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
!l9 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 88 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that
"medical justification" authorizes commitment).
100
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
101
Id. at 2081.
102
Id. at 2082.
94
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strategy for sexually violent offenders 103 in the preamble to the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act: 104 On the one hand, the
legislature noted that sexual predators generally have disorders
which are "unamenable to existing mental illness treatment
modalities" and that the "prognosis for rehabilitating sexually
violent predators in the prison setting is poor."105 On the other
hand, the state provided for commitment of sexually violent
predators "for control, care and treatment" at a facility operated by
the department of social and rehabilitation services. 106 The
Hendricks Court conceded that the treatment program the state
offered Hendricks was "meager" but justified the virtually nonexistent level of care because the Kansas program was new .107
At the time ofHendricks's commitment, Kansas had no funding or
staff in place for the program; Hendricks himself remained in a
mental health facility for ten months without the treatment
prescribed by statute.108 The apparent inconsistencies in statements by Kansas's legislature,109 as well as the difficulties-or
perhaps reluctance-of the state to implement its own legislative
mandate, provide a useful starting point for considering whether
treatment should be requisite to commitment as a matter of
constitutional law and as a matter of sound policy.
A. LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR THE TREATMENT REQUIREMENT

The Supreme Court has never squarely held that mentally ill
individuals have a constitutional right to treatment110 as a part

103

Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2077 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 59-29a01).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 ("The legislature finds that a small but extremely
dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or
defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to the treatment
act for mentally ill persons....").
1os Id.
106
Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a)).
107
Id. at 2085.
108
Id. at 2093 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109
See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (describing legislature's inconsistent
expressions); cf. Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 262-63 (describing Hendricks decision and
noting that Justice Thomas, writing for majority, "detected a degree of ambiguity in the
Kansas Supreme Court's resolution" regarding treatment requirement).
110
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,317 (1982) ("As a general matter a state is under
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border."); David
W. Burgett, Substantive Due Process Limits on the Duration of Civil Commitment for the
104
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of involuntary commitment, but several cases suggest such a
conclusion. m The Hendricks majority, in avoiding the issue of
right to treatment, completely ignored some of these cases, failed
to distinguish others, and relied on still others only for very general
principles not specifically related to the right to treatment.
First, the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana held that
indefinite pretrial commitment of a deaf, mute criminal defendant
was unconstitutional. 112 In Jackson, the Court held that due
process requires that the commitment bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.113
Accordingly, Indiana rationalized Jackson's pretrial commitment as
helping him attain competency to stand trial by providing care and
treatment in a state facility. 114 Jackson could never achieve
fitness for trial, however, because no Indiana institution provided
training or treatment that could improve his particular condition.115 Therefore, the Court held that continued detention of
Jackson was not reasonably related to the purpose of his commitment and hence, was unconstitutional. 116 The Hendricks majority
failed to discuss Jackson at all in deciding whether treatment was
necessary to sustain the Kansas sex offender commitment statute.
The only reference to Jackson by the Hendricks majority was in
support of the proposition that the "mental illness" element of

Treatment ofMental lllness, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 205, 213 n.32 (clnrifying that "right
to treatment" does not suggest affirmative right to state services, but rather condition on
state's rights to confine its citizens). See generally Morton Birnbaum, The Right to
Treatment, 46 AB.A. J. 499 (1960) (advocating right to treatment for individuals confined
in public institutions).
111
See generally Cornwell, supra note 41, at 1326 (citing cases that suggest existence or
right to treatment).
112
406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972) (invalidating commitment on equal protection and due
process grounds because state applied more lenient commitment standard and more
stringent release standard to defendant than to civilly committed individuals not charged
with criminal offenses).
113
Id. at 738.
114
Id. at 735.
115
See id. at 728 (noting record established that no treatment or training was available
at any state institution); see also THOMAS M'.AEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS: THE ORIGINS AND
EvOLUTION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 129-30 (1985) (describing testimony or two
psychiatrists regarding Jackson's mental deficiency, inability to learn sign language, and dim
prognosis, as well as other evidence in record establishing that state hospital could do
nothing to improve his condition).
116
Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738-39.
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commitment statutes can be described with a variety of expressions.117
The next Supreme Court decision to touch on the right to
treatment was O'Connor v. Donaldson, 118 regarding the fifteenyear custodial confinement of a man diagnosed with paranoid
schizophrenia. 119 In ruling that proof of mental illness, without
proof of dangerousness, was insufficient to sustain involuntary
commitment, the Court declined to reach the question of Donaldson's right to treatment. 120 The lower court, however, specifically
held that an involuntarily committed individual has "a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a
reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental
condition."121 The Supreme Court noted, but did not affirm, that
portion of the lower court decision and remanded the case on a
different question. 122 Despite the equivocal stance on treatment
expressed in the O'Connor opinion, many patients' rights advocates
viewed the decision as a vindication of the right to treatment, and
lower courts have continued to issue right to treatment decisions
after O'Connor. 123 Nevertheless, the only reference to O'Connor
in the Hendricks majority's treatment discussion is a quote from
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence regarding the power of a state
to commit dangerous, mentally ill persons. 124
In addition, the Supreme Court in Allen v. Illinois 125 discussed
the right to treatment with respect to the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. In deciding whether an alleged sexually dangerous person could claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self117
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1997) (noting that statute upheld in
Jackson used terms "incompetency" and "insanity").
118
422 U.S. 563,564 (1975) (holding confinement ofnondangerous, mentally ill individual
unconstitutional).
119
Id. at 569 (describing evidence that Donaldson's confinement was regime of custodial
care, not program designed to treat his illness).
120
Id. at 573-74 & n.8; ROBERT D. MILLER, !NVOLUNTARY CML COMMITMENT OF THE
MENTALLY ILL IN THE POST-REFORM ERA 104 (1987) (describing narrow holding in O'Connor).
121
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), affd, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
122
O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 577 (remanding on question of immunity of state agent).
123
MlLLER, supra note 120, at 105 (citing examples oflower court cases affirming right
to treatment).
124
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (1997) (noting that power to commit is not
defeated by fact that likelihood of recovery may be low).
125
478 U.S. 364, 365 (1986).
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incrimination, the Court had to decide whether the commitment
scheme was civil or criminal in nature. The Illinois statute avowed
an objective of "care and treatment" and disavowed any interest in
punishment. 126 Therefore, the court found that the statute was
not punitive and held that the defendant could not invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege.127 Justice Breyer, dissenting in Hendricks,
relied on the "treatment" analysis in Allen, noting that because
Kansas's objective was to treat rather than to punish seA'l.lally
dangerous persons, the state.had a "statutory obligation to provide
'care and treatment ... designed to effect recovery.' "128
The Hendricks majority also relied on AI.Zen in its two alternative
analyses of the treatment requirement. The Court first suggested
that a state may commit an individual without providing any
treatment. 129 In drawing that conclusion, Justice Thomas cited
.AUen,130 as well as United States v. Salerno, 131 for the general
proposition that incapacitation alone may be a legitimate state
end.132 Justice Thomas, however, failed to mention distinguishing facts of those two cases. In Allen, the Court said in dicta that
a state has authority under its police power to protect the community from danger. 133 That case, however, did not rely on the
police power justification since illinois clearly did provide treatment and thus was acting under its parens patriae authority. 134
Furthermore, Justice Thomas did not mention that the Salerno
holding was limited to the context of pretrial detention, a distinction relied on by the Foucha Court, in rejecting the broad right of
states to commit on the basis of dangerousness alone. 135

126

Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 375.
128
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Allen); Lending Cases,
supra note 17, at 264 (noting Breyer's reliance on Allen).
129
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084.
130
478 U.S. at 373.
131
481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987).
132
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084.
133
Allen, 478 U.S. at 373 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979)).
134
Id. (noting that Illinois's decision to supplement its parens pntriae concerns with
measures to protect safety of other citizens did not render statute punitive).
l3S See supra notes 33, 40 and accompanying text (describing holdings in Salerno and
Foucha).
121
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As an alternative to the conclusion that public safety alone could
justify commitment, Justice Thomas suggested that the Court
might conclude that treatment was the overriding purpose of the
Kansas legislature and that the state did provide such treatment.136 In that portion of the analysis, Justice Thomas again
cited Allen for the rule that "the State has a statutory obligation to
provide 'care and treatment.' "137 The majority concluded that
Kansas met its obligation by providing "meager" treatment to
Hendricks. 138
In sum, courts attempting to apply Hendricks in subsequent
cases are likely to be leery of the precedential value of the "treatment" portion of the decision. First, it rests on independent,
alternative grounds, and second, it was directed only at the double
jeopardy and ex post facto challenges, which require the statute to
be "non-punitive:" The Court crafted an opinion through cursory
treatment of earlier cases and managed to avoid establishing a
clear rule on the right to treatment of civilly committed sex
offenders.
In contrast, two leading lower court decisions, decided before
Hendricks, have held that civilly committed individuals have a
constitutional right to treatment. Not surprisingly, the Hendricks
majority did not mention either case. First, in Rouse v. Cameron, 139 Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit Court,
affirmed the right to treatment of an individual committed to a
psychiatric facility as not guilty by reason of insanity. Second, the
Fifth Circuit in Wyatt v. Aderholt, 140 after examining appalling
conditions in state-operated mental health facilities in Alabama, 141 held that ''the provision of treatment to those the state

138

Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084.
Id. at 2085 (quoting Allen, 478 U.S. at 373, and Illinois statute regarding state purposo
in treating sexually dangerous persons and describing treatment available in Kansas).
1as Id.
139
373 F.2d 451, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
140
503 F.2d 1305, 1306 (5th Cir. 1975), affg Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), implemented in 344 F. Supp. 373 (1972); see MILLER, supra note 120, at 104
(describing Wyatt as establishing constitutional right to treatment).
141
Wyatt, 503 F.2d at 1310 (describing conditions in hospital with 5000 inmates, patients
with open wounds, urine and feces on the floor, malnourished patients, accidental deaths of
patients due to inadequate supervision, and ratio of one master's level social worker for every
2500 patients).
137
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has involuntarily confined in mental hospitals is necessary to make
the state's actions in confining and continuing to confine those
individuals constitutional."142 Other circuit courts, as well as
lower federal and state courts, have relied on Wyatt as establishing
a constitutional right to treatment. 143
A recent district court case, also decided before Hendricks,
discussed the constitutional right to treatment specifically in the
context of sexually violent predators. The petitioner in Cameron v.
Walsh 144 was a fifty-three-year-old man, who was confined to a
wheelchair, diabetic, blind and suffering from heart disease. 145
He was transferred to a state treatment center for sexually
dangerous persons after six years of incarceration for various
offenses, including assault with intent to commit rape. 146 The
court examined Cameron's right to treatment claim in the context
of a double jeopardy challenge, which, like the Fifth Amendment
challenge in AJ,len,147 turned on finding that the commitment
scheme was not punitive in purpose or effect. 148 Cameron's
double jeopardy claim was precluded by his previously filed civil
rights suit,149 but the court held that since the facility to which
Cameron was committed actually provided some treatment, he
could not suggest that the state had a punitive intent in keeping
him there. 150
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to provide a clear rule on the
right to treatment for mentally ill persons, the Court has issued a
142

Id. at 1315.
See, e.g., Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Courts hnve long reccgnized
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit states to deprive
mentally ill individuals of their freedom for therapeutic purposes unless some level of
treatment is actually provided."); Id. at 100 (referring to Wyatt); Ohlinger v. Watson, 652
F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Wyatt and noting thnt "[n)dequnte and effective
treatment is constitutionally required because, absent treatment, appellants could be held
indefinitely as a result of their mental illness").
144
No. 95-10904-PBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11691, at •1 CD. Mass. July 23, 1996).
H

3

HS
146

Id.
Id. at *3 (indicating that defendant pied guilty te kidnapping, lo.rceny of motor vehicle,

assault with intent to commit rape, and threatening to commit crime).
m Allen. u. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 380 (1986).
Hs Cameron., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11691, at 0 19.
9
H Id. at *27 (describing petitioner's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. I 1998)).
150
Id. Note the similar reasoning in Kansas u. Hendricks where tho Supreme Court
suggested that if the Kansas commitment statute did require the state to provide treatment,
"meager" treatment was sufficient. 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (1997).
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definitive holding regarding the right to "habilitation"151 of mentally disabled persons. Mentally retarded individuals involuntarily
committed to state institutions have a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in receiving minimally adequate training or
habilitation. 152 The Court stated this rule in the leading case of
Youngberg v. Romeo, 153 based on the due process challenge of a
profoundly retarded thirty-three-year-old man with the mental
capacity of an eighteen-month-old child, who could not talk and was
unable to perform basic self-care skills independently. 154 Romeo
conceded that no amount of training would enable him to live
outside of an institution. 155 Thus, the liberty interest he claimed
was not the right to be released from confinement but the right to
be free from physical restraints while in the hospital. 156 The
Court agreed that Romeo had a constitutional right to minimally
adequate training in light of his liberty interests in safety and
freedom from unreasonable restraints. 157
Circuit courts have interpreted Youngberg generally as requiring
states to provide mentally retarded persons with habilitation
according to prevailing practice standards. 158 Some commenta151

"Habilitation" refers to training and skills development for persons with mental
retardation. Youngbergv. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,309 n.1 (1982). The term is distinguished
from "treatment" because mentally retarded individuals are not viewed as "ill," but rather
as learning disabled. Id.
152
Id. at 322 (finding respondent entitled to minimally adequate training by balancing
individual liberty interest against relevant state interests); id. at 324 (relying on Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), holding that conditions of confinement must comport with
purpose of confinement).
153
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
154
Id. at 309.
155
Id. at 317.
156
Id. The record documented several instances of injuries to Romeo from his own
violence and from reactions of other patients to his aggression. Id. at 310. Hospital staff
physically restrained or "shackled" Romeo routinely to prevent him from harming himself
or others. Id. at 310-11 & n.4. Romeo asserted a right to training or habilitation to reduce
his aggressive behavior and improve his self-care skills, which would accordingly reduce tho
need for physical restraints. Id. at 318.
157
Id. at 322; cf. Erlinder, supra note 3, at 134 (describing substantive due process test
in Youngberg as balance of individual liberty interests against demands oforganized society).
158
S.H. v. Edwards, 860 F.2d 1045, 1046 (11th Cir. 1988); Society for Good Will to
Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1246 (2d Cir. 1984); Phillips v. Thompson, 715
F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 1983); see also In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1005 (Wash. 1993) (relying
on Youngberg for proposition that involuntarily committed individuals are entitled to more
treatment than persons confined for punishment).

1998]

KANSAS V. HENDRICKS

1283

tors suggest Youngberg stands for the right to treatment for all
types of commitments.159 The Hendricks majority, however, failed
even to mention, much less to distinguish, the Youngberg holding.
In reviewing cases on the right to treatment, what is startling is
not the suggestion that sexual perpetrators should receive treatment for their disorders, but that the Supreme Court has managed
to hedge on the question of the right to treatment for civilly
committed sexual offenders. The Court's equivocation allows states
to have their cake and eat it too; states can purport to confine
sexual predators for "care and treatment" but can, without violating
the Constitution, refuse to provide any treatment at all. This
formulation appears particularly flawed after consideration of the
prevailing state policy justifications for civil commitment of sexual
offenders.
B. STATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COMMIT.MENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS

Sexual predator commitment statutes usually are premised on
state police powers and parens patriae powers. 160 Police power
authorizes the state to deprive one person's liberty for the welfare
of society generally, but the power cannot be expanded to justify
preventative detention without offending current Supreme Court
precedent. Likewise, the parens patriae power justifies state action
on behalf of vulnerable citizens; yet, states do not truly consider sex
offenders vulnerable. Therefore, both of these theories of state
power over individual liberty fail to provide constitutional justification for civil commitment of sex offenders.
1. Police Power. The Supreme Court has suggested that if a
state justifies its sexual predator commitment act on police power,
the state may not be required to provide any treatment at all. 161
159
Erlinder, supra note 3, at 134-35 (describing Youngberg as general test. for determining
substantive due process rights of persons committed under "Psychopathic Personnlit.y
statute[s]"); K Edward Greene, Mental Health Care for Children: Before and During State
Custody, 13 CAMPBELL L. REv. 1, 20 (1990) (noting that although majority in Youngberg did
not address treatment rights of all persons in mental institutions, analysis is appropriate for
evaluating rights of civilly committed mentally ill individuals).
160
See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text (describing state policy justifications).
161
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (1996) (noting that incapacitation may be
legitimate state end, relying on Allen v. fllinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986), and United States
v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987)).
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The state, under its police power, may incapacitate mentally ill
individuals for the purpose of protecting society from dangerous
tendencies of sexual predators. 162 Under this view, a state's
interest in protecting the public health and safety of the population
as a whole justifies depriving a single individual's liberty. 163 For
example, states rely on police powers as the constitutional basis for
quarantine laws. An individual with a contagious disease may be
confined in order to protect society from infection-even if no
treatment is available. 164 Similarly, the state interest in public
health also justifies invasion of an individual's right to privacy. For
example, the state may compel individuals to undergo treatment for
dangerous, contagious diseases. 165
In the context of commitment of sexually dangerous persons,
some courts, including the Hendricks Court in its first of two
"treatment" analyses, assert that police power alone may justify
indefinite preventative detention. 166 But a brief review of Supreme Court precedent on civil commitment belies such a suggestion. The narrow context for pretrial detention of dangerous
arrestees in Salerno, 161 as well as the refusal of the Foucha 168

162
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); see also State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115,
133 (Wis. 1995) (stating that "the state has a compelling interest in protecting tho public
from dangerous mentally disordered persons").
163
Janus, supra note 52, at 167.
164
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (noting that persons are subject to
burdens, such as vaccination, in order to secure general comfort, health and prosperity of
state); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 186 U.S.
380, 388 (1902) (cited by majority in Hendricks for proposition that state can civilly dotain
such persons even in the absence of treatment); see State v. Fulton, 166 N.W.2d 874, 885
(Iowa 1969) (comparing procedure and purpose of sex offender commitment to quarantino for
contagious and infectious diseases).
165
See McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding stato intorost
in preventing spread of tuberculosis in prison population justified compelled medical
treatment of inmate); Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378, 1382 (10th Cir. 1973)
(upholding city ordinance allowing involuntary detention and treatment of persons suspected
of having venereal diseases).
166
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (1997); see, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 583-84 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring) (suggesting that state can exorciso polico
power to "protect society from the dangers of significant antisocial acts or communicablo
disease"); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Ct., 309 U.S. 270, 275 (1940); Bniloy v.
Gardenbring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1154 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914
(Minn. 1994).
167
United States v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739, 749-50 (1987).
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Court to uphold commitment without a showing of mental illness
cut against suggestions that states may involuntarily commit
individuals under police powers on the basis of dangerousness
alone. 169 To conclude otherwise is contrary to one of the most
fundamental notions of our criminal justice system. Individuals
may be confined as punishment because they commit affirmative
acts, not merely because they have dangerous inclinations. 170
Therefore, the potential danger that sex offenders present to society
is insufficient to justify indefinite commitment after their punitive
detention term ends. Accordingly, most states recognize that the
mental illness element in sexual predator laws, and not just the
element of dangerousness, is essential to the commitment
schemes.171 Nevertheless, "pathologizing" sexual offenders and
"medicalizing" the problem of sexual violence is an inappropriate
solution to this social problem. 172
2. Parens Patriae. As the police power justification is insufficient to sustain sexual perpetrator commitment schemes, states
turn to their parens patriae authority. Parens patriae is the power
of the state to act on behalf of juveniles or other individuals who

168
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85 (1992) (denying power of state to detain
dangerous individual indefinitely without medical justification).
169
Erlinder, supra note 3, at 152-53 (rejecting suggestion that predicted dangerousness
alone justifies detention); Janus, supra note 52, at 163 (describing "jurisprudenco of
prevention" which balances state interest in safety against individual interest in liberty,
ignoring mental disorder element in civil commitment).
170
Statev. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 136 (Wis. 1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) ("Although
the end result may seem attractive, under our constitutions the state cannot simply lock
people up on the supposition that they will be dangerous in the future when they have
already served their sentences for crimes committed in the pll.St. n). "[N)o temporal tribunal
can search the heart, or fathom the intentions of the mind, otherwise than as they are
demonstrated by outward actions, it therefore cannot punish for whnt it cannot know."
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 180 (Sanford H. Kadish &
Stephen J. Schulhofer eds., 1995) (citing William Blackstone).
171
See Dan W. Brock, Involuntary Commitment: The Moral Issues, in l',Ifil.."TAL ILL."lESS:
LAW AND PuBLIC POLICY 147, 154 (Baruch A. Brody & H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. eds. 1980)
[hereinafter LAW AND PuBLIC POLICY] (distinguishing civil commitment from incm-cerotion
on basis that civil commitment lacks condemnation or assignment of guilt).
172
See Morse, supra note 3, at 129 ("We cannot justly solve our socinl problems by
'medicalizing' them and then granting the state otherwise unjustified powers to control the
lives of citizens."); see also infra Section V.A. (discussing medicnl model in relation to
commitment of sexual predators).
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are unable to care for themselves. 173 A state may deprive an
individual's liberty not because of the threat to others in society but
because of the risk that the individual will harm himself. For
example, a state may limit the liberty of a child or incompetent
individual in order to protect that vulnerable person from
harm. 174 The parens patriae power turns on an individual's
"incompetence," therefore labelling sex offenders "mentally ill" is
crucial to invoke this power.
Nevertheless, states still have to rely on broad assumptions about
mental illness and sexual deviance to rely on their parens patriae
authority. Individual liberty is predicated on the belief that people
are capable of rational thought. 175 Mentally ill people, by contrast, are deemed incapable of rational thought. Accordingly, they
are not legally responsible for their acts 176 and the state may
restrict their individual liberties. 177 It is at this point that the
logic behind the parens patriae justification for civil commitment
of sexual offenders breaks down-states do not and cannot show
173
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) ("The state has a legitimate interest
under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of
emotional disorders to care for themselves."); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271 (Utah
1988) (noting that because parens patriae is premised on state caring for those who cannot
care for themselves, power is implicated only when individual cannot make own evaluation
of need for treatment); Bassiouni, supra note 81, at 299-300 (describing parens patriao power
of state to protect individual from harming himself and accompanying duty to confine such
individual for care and treatment); Janus, supra note 52, at 171 (asserting that parons
patriae power depends on existence of mental illness for its internal logic).
174
Cecelia M. Espenoza, Good Kids, Bad Kids: A Revelation About the Due Process Rights
of Children, 23 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 407, 414 (1996) (noting that parens patriao power
emerged from perceived need to protect vulnerable children and power justified state action
contrary to liberty interest of children); Rolf E. Sartorius, Paternalistic Grounds for
Involuntary Civil Commitment: A Utilitarian Perspective, in LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra
note 171, at 137, 139 (noting that if individual has condition which renders him dangerous
to himself as well as incapable of rational decision to act in less dangerous way, state may
legitimately interfere with his liberty to prevent him from harming himselO.
175
Bassiouni, supra note 81, at 298 (noting power of state to restrain persons incapable
ofrespecting public order); Teir & Coy, supra note 3, at 414 (suggesting that society allows
independent choice and conduct so long as under rational control).
176
Bassiouni, supra note 81, at 298 (describing state's parens patriae power over people
who are unable to respect public order due to their "legal irresponsibility").
177
Cornwell, supra note 41, at 1332 (noting that "involuntary commitment is appropriate
only for those incompetent to make rational decisions about their care or treatment"); Toir
& Coy, supra note 3, at 414 ("The mentally ill ... enjoy a diminished amount of individual
liberty because they are incapable of making the rational choices that are necessary to
participate as full members of society.").
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that sexual offenders as a class, are incapable of rational
thought. 178 Moreover, the fact that one of the elements of civil
commitment of sexual offenders is a prior criminal act179 suggests
that states certainly do not consider these individuals "legally
irresponsible"180 since the state, in prosecuting offenders, already
held them responsible for their acts.
V. DOES PARENS PATRIAE JUSTIFY STATE ACTION?

In order to commit sexual offenders involuntarily under its
parens patriae powers, a state must first demonstrate that the
individual is "incompetent" or "sick."181 Second, the purpose of
the commitment must bear some reasonable relation to the confinement; that is, the state must show its purpose is "care and
treatment."182 The problem with the parens patriae justification
is that sex offenders may not be "sick" or "incompetent" and,
moreover, they may not be treatable.
A. ARE SEXUAL OFFENDERS "SICK" OR "INCO:MPETENT"?

The power of a state to infringe individual liberty under its
parens patriae power turns not on what the individual "did," but on
what the individual "is."183 This distinction relates to the question under Foucha 184 regarding the "mental illness" or "mental
178

See Teir & Coy, supra note 3, at 425 (stating without reservation that sex offenders
can recognize difference between right and wrong).
179
See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing elements of sexually violent
predator commitment schemes including past conduct).
180
Morse, supra note 3, at 135 ("Nonresponsibility is usually a necessary condition of
justifiable involuntary civil commitment • • • but proponents of newer [sex offender
commitment] laws provide no coherent theory to suggest that sexual offenders as a class are
not responsible.").
181
See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text (describing basis of power).
182
Brock, supra note 171, at 171 ("Where involuntary commitment is on paternalistic
grounds ofincompetence, mental illness and treatability, the involuntary hospitalization and
provision of treatment is for the person's own good.").
183
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967) (describing parens patriae and goal of juvenile
justice system as determining what a child "is" and how he became what he is, rather than
determining guilt or innocence); Morse, supra note 3, at 121 (noting that sex offender
commitments are more harmful to individual dignity because they label or classify offenders,
rather than punish acts of free will).
164
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
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abnormality" requirement for sex offender commitment. 185 But
even if Foucha can be read to afford states broad discretion to
define "mental illness" in their sex offender statutes,186 those
definitions may still be insufficient to justify state deprivation of
liberty under parens patriae. The parens patriae power turns on
finding the individual incapacitated or incompetent and thus in
need of protection by the state. 187
In its substantive due process discussion, the Hendricks Court
suggested that lack of competency and responsibility were important elements of states' statutory definitions of "mental illness" or
"mental abnormality."188 Consider, however, the definition of
mental abnormality in the statute under which Kansas committed
Leroy Hendricks: " 'Mental abnormality' means a congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity
which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in
a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and
safety of others."189 This definition emphasizes the "menace to
... others" presented by sexual offenders which involves the police
power, but the definition says nothing to suggest incapacity or need
for protection of the committed individual himself, consistent with
the state's parens patriae power. The definition does suggest that
sexual offenders suffer from a "volitional" impairment,190 which
renders them "incapable" of resisting certain actions. The definition does not suggest that such "volitional" impairment causes
sexually dangerous persons to endanger themselves, but rather that
the impairment predisposes them to hurt others. Thus, the
185

See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text (discussing confusion over definition of
mental illness element of commitment).
186
See supra notes 43, 48 (noting deference to state legislative determinations).
187
Bruce J. Winick,Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance ofMental Illness,
1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 534, 587 (1995) (noting that parens patriae power is promised
on presumed incapacity of minors and of mentally disabled persons to protect or care for
themselves).
186
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (1996) (distinguishing legal definitions
from medical definitions by noting that legal definitions must "take into account such issues
as individual responsibility ... and competency") (citing DSM-IV, supra note 47, at xxiii,
xxvii).
169
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994).
190
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081 (noting Hendricks's lack of volitional control which, along
with dangerousness, suggests that sexual offenders should not be dealt with exclusively in
the criminal justice system).
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definition fails to describe a person in need of state care and
protection.
The Kansas statute also provides for commitment of individuals
with personality disorders. 191 The term "personality disorder" is
a recognized medical diagnostic category192 and may be a sufficient predicate for commitment under Foucha. 193 Nevertheless,
that diagnostic category in no way suggests that the individual is
"incompetent" or in need of protection from self-harm. Thus, the
condition cannot trigger a state's parens patriae authority to
deprive an individual of his liberty. 194
B. DO STATES REALLY AIM TO

"TREAT" SEXUAL OFFENDERS?

Civil commitment statutes for sex offenders are not enacted by
legislatures out of compassion for persons they deem "sexually
dangerous."195 Given society's disdain for sexual deviants196
and the fact that many sex offender commitment statutes are
191
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01, 59-29a02(a) (allowing commitment of persons convicted
of or charged with sexually violent offense who suffer from a "mental abnormality" or
"personality disorder").
192
DSM-IV, supra note 47, at 629-73 (describing first diagnostic criterion of personality
disorder: "[a]n enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly
from the expectations of the individual's culture").
193
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 87-88 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring); In re
Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 1994) ("We do not read Foucha to prohibit Minnesota's
commitment program for psychopathic personalities."); see supra note 47 (discussing
antisocial personality disorder). But see Morse, supra note 3, at 126 (noting that person
diagnosed with "antisocial personality disorder" is unlikely to be involuntarily committed
under general civil commitment standard because he seems too rational to qualify as
nonresponsible).
194
S~opp, supra note 72, at 187 (noting that statutory definition of sex offenders does
not suggest impairment of processes that would undermine individual's status as competent
practical reasoner); Wmick, supra note 187, at 587 (noting that assumption that mental
illness substantially impairs decision-making capacity is not true for many conditions).
195
In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996) (noting that legislature's "overriding
concern" was detention of sexual offenders and treatment with goal of reintegration was
"incidental, at best"), rerld sub nom. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997); State v.
Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 139 (WIS. 1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) ("lT]o suggest that [the
commitment] law is merely a benign exercise of the State's parens patriae authority ••• is
to ignore the reality of the political context in which this law was passed and the manner in
which it was drafted." (quoting Wisconsin circuit court in Stale v. Carpenter, No. 94-CF-1216
(Dane County July 22, 1994))).
196
See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (describing society's views of sex
offenders).
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enacted in response to public outrage,197 such a suggestion seems
almost laughable. The political reality runs contrary to the parens
patriae justification for commitment. The premise of parens
patriae is that the state incapacitates an individual in order to
treat and rehabilitate him so that he can reenter society as a full
and productive member. 198 States do not, however, appear to
enact sex offender commitment laws out of an interest in returning
"recovered" sexual predators to the community. In fact, these
statutes seem to be enacted for the very purpose of preventing such
reintegration.
The juvenile justice system provides a useful comparison for
considering states' actual motivations with respect to treatment
and rehabilitation of persons detained under parens patriae. States
originally limited their parens patriae power to care and custody of
vulnerable children. More recently, states have extended the reach
of the parens patriae power to authorize commitment of "ill" or
"incompetent" adults. The current trend in juvenile justice,
however, has been away from the idea of protecting wayward
children and towards placing individual responsibility on juveniles
for their antisocial acts. States increasingly reject the appropriateness of parens patriae authority over disruptive juveniles,199 yet
they invoke that same authority to "care for" the disfavored class
of sexual offenders. These policy approaches are inconsistent and
the stark contrast between them betrays the true legislative intent
behind sex offender commitment laws.
At its inception, the juvenile justice system relied on the parens
patriae theory, with the objective of providing treatment and
rehabilitation to help delinquent children become productive

197

See, e.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d 989,992 (Wash. 1993) (describing political context for
passage of Washington Community Protection Act).
198
E.g., Hill v. State, 661 N.E.2d 1285, 1290-91 (Mass. 1996) (emphasizing that
commitment of sexually dangerous persons is intended to provide individual with
opportunity to overcome his uncontrollable sexual urges so that he can successfully reenter
society); Bassiouni, supra note 81, at 300 (noting parens patriae objective of restoring
individual to useful role in society).
199
See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting suggestion
that parens patriae authority requires states to provide treatment as a part of incarceration
of juvenile delinquents).
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citizens.200 Early twentieth-century reformers advocated a juvenile justice system to provide treatment and rehabilitation of
"delinquents" rather than punishment and incarceration in the
adult penal system. AB a part of the reformed approach, states
relaxed the formality and procedural rules of adult adjudication.201 Juveniles traded the procedural protection of the adult
courts for the rehabilitative benefits of the juvenile system.202
Nevertheless, the reality of the juvenile system was that juveniles
got the "worst of both worlds"203 because states failed to provide
care and treatment to their delinquent charges.
In response to such criticism, courts have expanded procedural
protections for juveniles,204 but states have not yet improved
treatment in juvenile detention facilities. 205 Increasingly, delinquent children are held legally responsible for their actions. 206
They are no longer presumed incapable of rationally exercising free
will and thus in need of protection and care.207 In light of the
demise of informal juvenile proceedings, as well as changing

200
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967)(noting belief of early juvenile justice reformers that
role of society was to determine "what had best be done in (the child's) interest and in the
interest of the state to save him from a downward career").
201
CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 742-45 (Samuel 1L Davis, et nl. eds. 1997) (describing
origins and philosophy of juvenile justice system).
202
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (noting that juvenile system
denies certain due process safeguards, which is constitutionally acceptable since purpose of
incarceration is rehabilitation, not punishment); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (providing that effective treatment is the quid pro quo of society's right to
exercise its parens patriae power). But cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 585-87
(1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (rejecting quid pro quo theory ofstate's obligation to pro\ide
treatment in exchange for deprivation of liberty); Greene, supra note 159, at 33 (noting
Burger's rejection of quid pro quo theory).
203
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (asserting that juveniles got neither
procedural protections of adult courts nor "solicitous care nnd regenerative treatment•
intended for children).
204
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-20 (expanding procedural protections including notice of
charges, right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination as well as prhilege
against self-incrimination for children in delinquency hearings).
205
Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 14, at 1791 (noting juvenile institutions "have
historically been understaffed, unhealthy, and devoid of rehabilitative programming").
206
Espenoza, supra note 174, at 416 (noting that juveniles are now held strictly
accountable for their crimes in contrast to older view that they were mornlly incapable of
committing crimes).
Cf. Holland & 1flyniec, supra note 14, at 1795 (noting that early juvenile court
statutes rejected notion of free will and sought origin of juvenile delinquency elsewhere).
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notions ofjuvenile responsibility for bad behavior, states have little
legal incentive to provide treatment and rehabilitation to juvenile
offenders.208
The inappropriateness of the parens patriae power as a justification for commitment of sexually violent predators is evident when
compared to states' approaches to juveniles under the same theory.
First, sexual predator statutes were not sparked by public sympathy whereas compassion was the impetus for early juvenile
reform. 209 Second, sex offenders were never promised treatment
and rehabilitation in exchange for relaxed legal process, the
premise of reform in juvenile courts. In fact, sex offender statutes
typically contain a range of procedural protections. 21° Finally,
states have never suggested that sex offenders lack free will or are
legally irresponsible which was the perception ofjuvenile offenders.
In fact, most sex offender laws require as an element of commitment that the individual have been previously charged with or
convicted of a sexual offense.211 Given these distinctions, the
inappropriateness of parens patriae power in the context of sexual
predators becomes evident. The origins and assumptions underlying states' power to deprive the liberty of juveniles for their own
protection do not apply to sex offender detentions. States invoke
their parens patriae power to justify commitment but lack a sincere
interest in the "treatment and care" of sexually violent predators.
C. ARE SEXUAL OFFENDERS "TREATABLE"?

The Hendricks Court left unanswered the question of whether
sexual offenders are treatable.212 Indeed, the majority did not
208
Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting class action claim
of right to treatment in juvenile detention camp in Puerto Rico, in part, on state's power to
confine juveniles solely to protect society); Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 14, at 1794 (tracing
decline of right to treatment injuvenilejustice after recent judicial decisions). But cf. JOHN
P. WILSON, THE RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENTS IN THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 247 (1978)
(concluding that juveniles' right to treatment was gaining recognition by courts and
legislatures in previous era).
209
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26 (noting themes of compassion, goodwill, benevolence, and
paternalism in early conceptions of juvenile court).
210
See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (describing various procedural due
process protections in sexual predator acts).
211
See supra note 52 (outlining elements of sexual offender commitment statutes),
212
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (1997) (rejecting Hendricks's assertion that
he was denied available treatment but not definitively concluding that Kansas considered
Hendricks untreatable).
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consider determination of that crucial question essential to its
holding, which was based on alternative grounds.213 Justice
Breyer, in bis dissent, suggested that Kansas did concede that
treatment was available for Hendricks's condition; thus, the dissent
framed the issue instead as whether the state had to provide the
treatment it conceded was available.214
The Hendricks Court's awkward response to the "treatability" of
sexual offenders reflects the lively dispute on that point among
scholars.215 Resolution of the question, however, is crucial to the
parens patriae justification for commitment.216 If a state deprives
an individual's liberty because he is unwell and dangerous yet fails
to provide any treatment for that condition, the commitment
becomes a life sentence.217 "Treatment" is the "key" that unlocks
the hospital door.218
How, then, does a state "treat" a legislatively created condition?219 Most sex offender commitment statutes define "se::i-.."Ually
dangerous persons" very generally, and thus the definitions do not

213
Id. (rejecting Hendricks's ex post facto and double jeopardy claims on basis that either
incapacitation alone may be legitimate non-punitive state end or that Hendricks did receive
treatment for his condition and thus his commitment was not punitive in purpose or effect).
214
Id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting} (citing Kansas attorney general's response during
trial that Hendricks was treatable and suggesting that no one argued to tho contrary).
215
RoNALD M. HOLMES, THE SEX OFFENDER AND THE CRThllNAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 168
(1983) (describing various therapeutic approaches to sex offenders); SANDRA L. INGERSOLL
& SUSAN 0. PATI'ON, TREATING PERPETRATORS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 79 (1990) (noting lack of
research on treatment of perpetrators); ADELE :MAYER, SEX OFFENDERS: APPROACHES TO
UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGEMENT 62 (1988) (arguing that mental health professionals
appear to be advocating therapy in absence of proven methodologies); Monahan & Davis,
supra note 2, at 199 (describing study which noted that "none of these data prove that any
particular treatment is effective in helping to rehabilitate sex offenders").
216
MAYER, supra note 215, at 82 {"The mistaken assumption of 'trea.tability' has been
based largely on a needed rationale to justify implementation of therapeutic programs.").
217
See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 923 {Minn. 1994) (Wahl, J., dissenting)
{questioning how Blodgett can show he is no longer in need of treatment when "the very
p5Ycb.iatrists who are charged with treating him say there is no treatment for an antisocial
personality disorder").
218
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1994) (providing for release on showing that "person
is safe to be at large and will not engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged"); MINN.
STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 15 (1992) (providing that sexual predator mny be confined indefinitely
until he shows to satisfaction of commission and special review board that he is no longer
dangerous and no longer in need of treatment).
219
Erlinder, supra note 3, at 133 ("Hospitalization and medical treatment cannot cure n
legislatively created category.").
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accurately reflect the myriad diagnoses that may describe people
who commit sex crimes.220 Nevertheless, states typically recommend similar treatment for the entire category of offenders. 221
The over-generalization in diagnosis and treatment interventions
for sex offenders may, in part, explain the lack of success in
"curing" sexual offenders. 222 In fact, there is no reason to believe
that sex offenders are any more "treatable" than other criminals
generally. 223 States must assume that sexual predators are
treatable in order to justify indefinite commitment; states purport
to rehabilitate rather than just detain. Until it is clear that
treatment could actually help these offenders overcome their sexual
tendencies, however, states cannot single them out as a class for
preventative detention.
VI. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES

The preceding sections or"this Note described the legal precedent
for a constitutional right to treatment224 and suggested that the
Court in Hendricks 225 failed adequately to address that prece-

220
See, e.g., Monahan & Davis, supra note 2, at 196 (describing diagnoses given to sex
offenders evaluated for California program, including "sexual deviation," "personality
disorders," "pedophilia," and "psychosis").
221
MAYER, supra note 215, at 79. See generally Carl Warren Gilmore, Treating Sex
Offenders, WIS. LAW. Oct. 1994 at 20, 21-23 (describing assessment procedures and standard
programming established by Wisconsin Department of Corrections to serve some 600 sex
offenders annually).
222
In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 918 n.1 & 925 n.15 (Wahl, J., dissenting) (noting limited
success of treatment of committed offenders in Minnesota facilities and citing William D.
Erickson, The Psychopathic Personality Statute, Need for Change 3, 19 (1991) (unpublished
paper presented by the Commissioner of Human Services to the Minnesota Legislature)).
Dr. Erickson reported that of 21 men committed under the sex offender statute, only one was
making reasonable progress in treatment, none were mentally ill, and none were taldng
psychotropic medications. Id. at n.15. Cornwell, supra note 41, at 1329 (conceding reports
of poor outcome in treatment programs for sex offenders by medical community but urging
flexibility so that clinicians might modify treatment to make it more effective); Hammel,
supra note 43, at 810 (noting that studies report disappointing results in treatment for sex
offenders, particularly for target population of sexual predator laws).
223
MAYER, supra note 215, at 82-85 (noting that sex offenders share many characteristics
with other criminals and hypothesizing about therapeutic approach); Morse, supra note 3,
at 140 (rejecting justification for preventive detention on basis that sexual predators arc
"specially treatable").
224
See supra Part IV.A.
225
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997).
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dent.226 In addition, this Note scrutinized the police power and
parens patriae power justifications for civil commitment of sex
offenders, finding these justifications inadequate to sustain the
massive liberty infringement. 227
The issue of sexual violence is serious and compelling for the
public and for state officials.228 Nevertheless, civil commitment
of sexual predators in absence of treatment is an appropriate
response to that concern. Thus, states should closely examine their
true purpose in confining sexually dangerous persons. If the true
state concern is safety and protection of the public, state legislators
can increase the underlying sentence for sex crimes.229 That approach seems most closely aligned with states' actual objective in
drafting sexual predator statutes-removing a disfavored class of
criminals from the streets. Increased sentencing also has the
benefit of presenting few administrative complexities,230 aside
from the pre-existing problems of overcrowding and limited
resources for penal facilities. Such a solution, furthermore, would
not present the potential constitutional deficiencies characteristic
of civil commitment.231

226

See Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 268-69 (concluding thnt Hendricr.s Court failed

to define parameters of civil commitment clearly and thus gnve states broad authority to

commit sex offenders indefinitely).
227
See supra Part IV.B.
228
Cornwell, supra note 41, at 1336 (describing sexual predation as "particularly noxious
and fearsome public problem"); Erlinder, supra note 3, at 158 (noting that government "must
find a way to respond to the legitimate public concern" over sexual violence); Tier & Coy,
supra note 3, at 426 (asserting that sexual predators are a "serious, recurrent, and difficult.
problem facing our society").
229
Tier & Coy, supra note 3, at 426 (noting that "longer jail terms [for sex offenders) mny
be warranted in some circumstances"); Marna J. Johnson, Comment, Minnesota's Sexual
Psyclwpathi.c Personality and Sexually Dangerous Person Statute: Throwing Away the Key,
21 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 1139, 1187 (1996) (suggesting that longer sentences are one way
to deter sexual violence).
230
Cf. infra notes 232-238 and accompanying text (describing various issues facing states
implementing treatment programs).
231
See Erlinder, supra note 3, at 158 (advocating longer sentences rather than civil
commitment and noting that even if legislature mandates life sentence for re-offenders,
"society would be well-protected without creating the threat to personnl liberty posed by
[commitment statutes]"). But cf. Cornwell, supra note 41, at 1336 (suggesting thnt enhanced
prison sentences are "virtually unimpeachable constitutionally" and expressing concern that
states will define "appropriate punishment" based on fear of recidivism rather than on
proportional blame).
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On the other hand, if the state's true concern is rehabilitation,
that purpose should be clearly stated in the legislative act, and the
state must actually provide care and treatment aimed at improving
the condition of these "sick" persons so that they can return to the
community as productive members. States face many difficulties
implementing treatment programs for sex offenders. First, states
may lack adequate resources to establish treatment programs. 232
Lack of funding, however, does not justify a state's failure to
comply with its constitutional mandate of providing treatment
when such treatment is the justification for infringing on individual
rights. 233 Second, states will actually have to resolve the issue of
whether sex offenders are treatable.234 In considering that
question, states may need to move away from a general, allinclusive statutory definition of"mental abnormality" to describe all
sexual predators and towards more particularized definitions of the
various conditions from which these individuals suffer. Such
clarification is necessary to facilitate appropriate and effective
treatment, rather than relying on the assumption that all sex
offenders will benefit from the same therapeutic interventions. 235
States will also need to identify those individuals whose deviant
behavior stems not from illness, but from the exercise of free will
and who thus should be punished rather than treated. Considerable resources will need to be invested to allow individualized
assessments of treatment needs and culp~bility.236
Furthermore, states may have to consider specific treatment
issues such as the efficacy of "compelled" treatment for persons
with sexual disorders. Certain treatment strategies may be

=

Burgett, supra note 110, at 258-59 (describing potential drain on state mental health
resources from civil commitment process); Hammel, supra note 43, at 811-12 (noting that
treatment programs "will have to be comprehensive and quite expensive to be effective" and
suggesting that California program failed to treat all eligible offenders due to lack offunds).
But cf. INGERSOLL & PATI'ON, supra note 215, at 92-94 (suggesting that sex offender
treatment programs might not incur overwhelming costs).
233
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1315 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that inadequate
resources cannot justify state's deprivation of individual's constitutional rights).
234
See supra Section V.c. (discussing treatability of sex offenders).
235
INGERSOLL & PATI'ON, supra note 215, at 22 (describing different treatment approaches
for various types of offenders).
236
Tier & Coy, supra note 3, at 426 (distinguishing sex offenders who are appropriately
handled through increased jail sentences from those who truly suffer from mental
abnormality and thus should receive treatment).
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ineffective for offenders who do not undergo treatment voluntarily.237 Moreover, if states commit sex offenders at the end of their
penal sentences rather than providing treatment during incarceration, they will need to consider the implications of delaying
treatment. After several years of imprisonment, offenders may
have less insight into their actions and incarceration itself may
exacerbate their pathologies.238 Therefore, states might consider
providing treatment well before offenders' penal sentences e:i-..-pire.
This Note calls for states to approach the serious problem of
sexual violence through principled and honest laws. By contorting
the legitimate state power of civil commitment over dangerous,
mentally ill individuals to encompass sexually violent predators,
states undermine their authority. States increase the social stigma
and perception of dangerousness on all mentally ill persons by
lumping the "obnoxious"239 class of sex offenders together with
other persons suffering from serious, chronic mental illnesses. As
a corollary, civil commitment of sex offenders in lieu of longer
punitive detention undermines the legitimacy of states' criminal
justice systems. By committing rather than jailing, states suggest
that sex offenders are less responsible and less blameworthy for
their wrongs than other criminals. If the state views sex offenders
as "sick" it should help them; if the state views them as "bad" it
should jail them. What a state constitutionally cannot do is
indefinitely imprison persons it has labelled mentally ill. States
should not sacrifice the integrity of their separate systems for care
and protection of mentally ill people, on the one hand, and for
social control of criminals, on the other hand, in order to respond
to public pressures regarding sexual violence.2''0

237
Gilmore, supra note 221, at 56 (describing range of attitude of inmaws towards
treatment); see HOLMES, supra note 215, at 168 (describing treatment approach which
requires admission of guilt as "the first step towards rehabilitation").
238
lNGERSOLL & PATI'ON, supra note 215, at 99-100 (quoting treatment specialist who
suggested that sex offenders come out of prison with worse fantasies, more violence, and
more anger than before incarceration).
239
Erlinder, supra note 3, at 158 (noting James Madison's theory that society will use its
power to disadvantage of "most obnoxious" persons and suggesting that "sexual predators
are certainly a minority most of society justifiably finds 'obnoxious' "}.
240
Janus, supra note 52, at 212-13 (describing principle of"criminnl interstitinlity" which
draws constitutional line between punishment and civil commitment); Morse, supra note 3,
at 154 (asserting that "legitimacy of both criminal and civil confinement systems depends
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VII. CONCLUSION
Society disapproves of individuals who violate its behavioral
norms. That notion is the basis of punishment in the criminal
justice system. Among violators of society's laws, we are particularly disdainful of persons who commit violent acts of sexual deviance.
Those acts offend both our behavioral standards and our moral
standards. The acts injure us in personal and intimate ways.
Accordingly, states have singled out sexual offenders for special
treatment.
Many states have enacted special sexual predator laws that
borrow from general civil commitment statutes authorizing
detention of mentally ill and dangerous persons. The purpose of
civil commitment is to provide care and treatment to mentally ill
persons so they can return to society. Civil commitment is
appropriate for mentally ill people because their conditions posed
risks to the public and to themselves. Civil, as opposed to criminal,
detention is constitutionally justified because mentally ill people
are vulnerable or incompetent and thus in need of state protection.
In contrast, sexual predators are not considered vulnerable or
incompetent but rather extremely dangerous and blameworthy.
Thus, the use of civil c;ommitment in the context of sexual predators is an inappropriate response to a serious social problem.
Nevertheless, states have seized the power of civil commitment
to authorize indefinite preventative detention of a particularly
disfavored class of criminals. To commit sexual deviants under
civil commitment statutes, states have had to stretch the definition
of "mental illness" to fit a diverse class of criminals whose deviant
tendencies stem from a wide range of biological and developmental
origins.241 States cannot, however, show that sex offenders, as a
class, are any more "sick" than other criminals who have violated
societal norms of behavior. Thus, the special commitment laws are
unjustified.
on maintaining the distinction between them"); Schopp, supra note 72, at 192 (concluding
that sex offender commitment laws "undermine moral force of both mental health and
criminal law").
241
Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 268-69 (concluding that Hendricks gives states
authority to "lock up indefinitely anyone who is found to fall into the nearly boundless
category of mentally abnormal-from the most profoundly insane to those who fall through
the cracks of the criminal justice system").
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Civil commitment is a massive infringement of individual liberty.
In order to justify such infringement as a matter of due process,
states must show a reasonable relation between a compelling state
interest and the purpose of the commitment. The two sources of
state power invoked to authorize civil commitment are police power
and parens patriae power. Both of these powers, however, fail to
justify civil commitment of sex offenders. Police power allows
-states to detain dangerous people who pose a risk to society. The
Supreme Court, however, has limited that power to very specific
situations which do not encompass sexual predator laws.
Parens patriae power allows states to detain vulnerable persons
who pose a risk to themselves. This state power, however, fails to
justify civil commitment of sexual predators for several reasons.
First, states do not really consider sex offenders to be vulnerable.
Second, even if states do consider sex offenders to be "ill," they do
not seek to rehabilitate them and return them to society. Finally,
even if states had such a goal they cannot show that treatment is
effective in "curing" sexual predators. Accordingly, states detain
sex offenders under the pretense of providing care and treatment
put in reality the individuals stand little or no chance of release.
The United States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks
recently upheld a Kansas statute which allows the state to detain
certain convicted sex offenders indefinitely in mental health
treatment facilities. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in the long
line of precedential cases preceding Hendricks has equivocated on
the right to treatment of persons detained under all types of civil
commitment laws. The Hendricks court perpetuated that ambiguity by failing to hold that Kansas must provide treatment in
conjunction with civil detention of sexually dangerous persons. The
Court, therefore, has left a loophole through which states can keep
prior sex offenders off the streets indefinitely. A legislative
statement that commitment is intended for "care and treatment"
may be enough to rebut a due process challenge even if no treatment ig actually provided.
This Note concludes, however, that such a result is unprincipled
and violates the premises of both criminal detention and civil
commitment. In light of the shortcomings of current justifications
for committing sexual offenders, states should address the serious
problem of sexual violence and public demands for safety through
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one of two distinct approaches. States which act primarily out of
concern for protecting society from dangerous sexual predators
should employ their pre-existing criminal justice systems to punish
and incarcerate those criminals. States which act out of concern for
the "ll" or deviant offender himself should treat and rehabilitate
that incompetent individual. By maintaining distinctions between
their criminal and mental health laws, states more effectively
address the serious problem of sexual violence without eroding
their legal authority in each system.
ELIZABETH
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